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Mr. Rein analyzes the evolution of the international and domestic govern-
mental interests in hijacking, discusses the available deterrents, and evaluates
the United States Government's response. Although a simple solution to the
problem is not apparent, he believes that an international mechanism, ap-
plying international standards to review a particular nation's action or in-
action in response to a skyjacking, is an absolute necessity. The author uses
the term "skyjacking" to emphasize acts directed against aircraft. "Aircraft
hijacking" is equally acceptable and widely used.
Q KYJACKING' presents a number of wholly unattractive faces to
government officials with responsibilities for the conduct of civil
aviation. It is criminal behavior threatening life and property. In inter-
national incidents such as the recent diversion and destruction of an
Indian airplane in Pakistan' it can be viewed as a hostile act, sponsored
by one state against another, which brings underlying hostilities to the
fore and provokes retaliation. It is a difficult legal problem as states de-
bate the jurisdictional priorities over those who have offended all their
interests. It is, in short, an unnecessary and intentional interference with
civil aviation that has diverted enormous resources toward prevention
and has increased aviation costs and risks.' The purpose of this article is
* Deputy Assistant Secretary for Transportation and Telecommunications, Bureau
of Economic Affairs, Department of State, Washington, D.C. The author gratefully
acknowledges the assistance of David Ortman, Assistant Chief of the Aviation Pro-
grams and Policy Division of the Office of Aviation, Department of State.
IThe term "skyjacking" means the unlawful seizure of control, or attempted seizure
of control of an aircraft in flight by a person on board through the use of force, threat,
or other form of intimidation. See Art. 1, Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
Seizure of Aircraft, reproduced in Dep't State Press Release No. 354 (Dec. 17, 1970).
The definition of "aircraft piracy" contained in 49 U.S.C. S 1472(i)(2) (1964) is some-
what more restrictive. Inherently related to skyjacking is the sabotage of aircraft, which
is also discussed herein.
2On January 30, 1971, an Indian Fokker Friendship aircraft was hijacked from
Spinijan to Lahore by two Kashmiri youths. The crew and passengers were released 48
hours later and were returned to India by bus. The hijackers remained on board the
aircraft, threatening to destroy it unless their demands, one of which involved Kashmiri
political prisoners in Indian jails, were met. On the evening of February 2, the hijackers
set fire to the aircraft and it was destroyed.
3 The Department of Transportation has requested a $37.7 million appropriation for
fiscal 1972 for the anti-hijacking program. We have no estimate of the cost to the
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not to condemn skyjacking-there can be no dispute on that issue-but
rather (a) to explore the governmental interests which are involved in
the problem and the measures which these interests have led govern-
ments to utilize in combating it, (b) the application of these measures
to the sources of the threat and their adequacy, and (c) the implications
of the international effort to protect civil aviation.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF GOVERNMENT INTEREST
A. Passenger Safety and Welfare
While our aviation industry has remained in the private sector, the
United States has taken vigorous regulatory action to ensure the safety
of the air traveler. Licensing of pilots, airworthiness standards for air-
craft, air traffic control procedures and federal supervision of airport
operations are illustrative of our appreciation of the inherent vulnerability
of air commerce and of our determination to reduce the risks of air travel
so that its immensely important benefits can continue to flow to the
public. Through the Chicago Convention of 1944,' and the continuing
work of the International Civil Aviation Organization established by that
convention, 120 nations have recognized their responsibility to under-
take a coordinated international effort to meet the potential hazards of
international air commerce and to permit international civil aviation to
develop as a vital, and often primary, link between the members of the
international community.
The enormous progress, domestic and international, toward control
of the inherent risks of air travel is illustrated by the growth of civil
aviation toward its present primary role in international passenger trans-
portation.' Unfortunately, although we have become more insulated from
technical hazards, civil aviation faces increased risks from intentional
acts of skyjacking and sabotage. These acts threaten direct personal in-
jury to passengers and crew and, by interrupting communications,
changing flight paths and altering landing destinations, strip from the
air traveler many of the carefully developed safeguards of the air trans-
port intrastructure.
The risk to life and property from unlawful interference is real and
substantial. In 1970-71, thirty-six persons were killed or wounded in the
world's airlines of detection devices, use of personnel for screening passengers and in-
specting baggage, and delays arising from inspection and screening requirements.
4Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180 (1944),
T.I.A.S. No. 1591 (effective Apr. 4, 1947).
5Of passengers traveling between the United States and foreign countries in 1970,
18,959,599 arrived or departed by air and 1,711,404 arrived or departed by sea. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERVICE, REPORTS OF PASSENGER TRAVEL
BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND FOREIGN COUNTRIES, CALENDAR YEAR 1970 (1971).
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course of attempted skyjackings.! Forty-seven lives were lost in a 1970
sabotage incident.' Sixty million dollars worth of property damage was
suffered in 1970 alone due to the destruction of aircraft.8 The losses
occasioned by diversion of aircraft and crews from commerical service
were staggering, and the terror imposed on innocent passengers and
crews was, by any measure, intolerable. Given the nature and magnitude
of this threat to person and property, this government and other mem-
bers of the international community would have been derelict in their
obligations to the traveling public had they not taken strong action to
meet it. Governmental interest in aviation safety has, therefore, provided
the basic motivation for national and international efforts to combat
skyjacking.
B. Safeguarding the Aviation System
Citizen safety and welfare are not, however, the only government
interests involved in international civil aviation. As economic forces have
created an increasingly interdependent international community, nations
have come to realize that the functioning of the transportation and com-
munications systems which tie them together are matters of joint con-
cern. Because skyjacking and sabotage strike at potential passengers in
addition to those directly involved, and because the security measures
necessary to meet this problem may delay and disrupt all air commerce,
a governmental interest exists in protecting the smooth functioning of
the international aviation system as well as the safety and welfare of
citizen passengers.
The importance of this dual set of interests is more than academic.
It is the second interest, or the interest in maintaining the smooth oper-
ation of the international aviation system, which justifies the concern of
states with skyjackings which do not involve their citizens or property
and which permits the international community to place responsibilities
upon "uninvolved" states for seeing that skyjackers are apprehended and
properly dealt with. It is this system interest which has brought the sky-
jacking problem before the United Nations and its specialized agencies.
Further, it is the system interest which makes the experience in develop-
ing international rules and procedures to deal with skyjacking relevant
to other international concerns.
C. The Available Tools
The duality of interest is reflected in the measures the United States
6 Unofficial statistics maintained by the Office of Aviation, Department of State,
Washington, D.C.
7 On February 21, 1970, an explosion occurred aboard a Swiss airliner bound for
Israel, shortly after takeoff from Zurich, killing 38 passengers and nine crewmembers.
N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 1970, § 1, at 1, col. 2.
8 Unofficial estimate, Office of Aviation, Department of State, Washington, D.C.
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has taken to combat the threat. Our first reaction was to review the ap-
plicable criminal sanctions and to increase the penalties in order that
they would reflect the seriousness of the crime. At the same time, the
airlines were encouraged to develop screening procedures which would
keep potential skyjackers from boarding their aircraft. These measures
have continued to be a mainstay in our domestic efforts. Prosecution
has been emphasized; preboarding controls have been strengthened by
the use of more sophisticated screening profiles and the use of weapons
detection devices has been increased; and since last September specially
trained sky marshals have been placed on board United States aircraft.
Some of the United States' international efforts have expressed a
similar prevention-oriented response. Systematic exchanges of intelligence
information on potential hijackers have been established;9 we have
pooled experience on preventive techniques and last January the United
States sponsored a major international conference on detection devices
and policy coordination."0 These efforts, while costly and time con-
suming for passengers, must continue on certain international flights
until the threat is under control.
The first international legal effort related to skyjacking supported
welfare and safety interests. The Tokyo Convention of 1963 required
signatory states to return skyjacked aircraft to the control of their com-
manders and to facilitate passengers' return to their scheduled destina-
tions. It also established a basis for national jurisdiction over crimes
committed aboard aircraft in international airspace.
As the volume of skyjackings increased, however, and as the danger
arose of a real impediment to airline operations, the international com-
munity began to more vigorously assert its concern for the system. In a
special assembly of ICAO at Montreal in June 1970 and in that fall's
session of the United Nations General Assembly, skyjackings were con-
demned without regard to the claimed political motives of the skyjacker.
On October 1, 1970, the Council of ICAO adopted resolutions calling
upon states to take joint action, including the suspension of air services,
against a state which failed to fulfill its international obligations to pro-
tect passengers and aircraft skyjacked for blackmail purposes or to act
against the perpetrators."
In December 1970 the international community achieved a significant
breakthrough by adopting The Hague Convention discussed in detail
9 Address by John A. Shaffer, Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration, to
North Atlantic Council, Oct. 20, 1970.
10Seventy-six nations were represented at the International Air Transport Security
Meeting held in Washington, D.C. at the Department of State, January 11-13, 1971.
Information was exchanged on techniques, systems, and procedures used in detecting
potential hijackers and their weapons.
1"LXIII DEP'T STATE BULL. 449-53 (Oct. 19, 1970).
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elsewhere in this symposium." By defining the crime of skyjacking in an
international convention and by imposing a universal obligation to ap-
prehend and extradite or punish skyjackers, The Hague Convention
clearly acknowledged that the actions of states against skyjackers were
in part in pursuit of their own police responsibilities and in part in pur-
suit of their responsibilities to the civil aviation community. 8 By im-
posing these responsibilities without exception, the Convention ac-
knowledged that the interest in the international aviation system is
sufficient for states to disregard the political issue of furthering their own
international interests vis-a-vis a state with which they might be in
political conflict.
The Hague Convention has been supplemented by a convention on
unlawful acts against the safety of civil aviation.1" A further innovation
sponsored by the United States and Canada, pursuant to the October 1,
1970, resolutions of the ICAO Council," would make art even more
significant acknowledgment of the system interest. The United States-
Canada proposal would permit an international panel of legal experts
to act upon the complaint of a state whose nationals or aircraft were
skyjacked and held for blackmail purposes."6 The experts would deter-
mine whether the obligations described in the Tokyo, Hague and other
applicable international conventions were complied with. In case of vio-
lation, the United States-Canada proposal would permit a joint meeting
of involved members of the international community to consider joint
action against the state in violation, including suspension of commercial
air services.
No doubt, the complex issues raised by the United States-Canada pro-
posal will require extensive international consideration; as it was evident
at the recent ICAO Assembly the problems attendant thereto are sub-
stantial. But the willingness of the international community to consider
means of enforcing substantive obligations related to skyjacking cer-
tainly highlights the system interest and strongly suggests that questions
of joint international enforcement of obligations necessary to maintain
such international systems will become increasingly important in an
interdependent world community. This is likely to stimulate the search
for means of depoliticizing the necessary compliance pressures.
12 See Mankiewicz infra at 195.
Is The recent Hague Convention contains a universal jurisdiction provision which
is unique in modem conventions. See Art. 4, Convention for the Suppression of Unlaw-
ful Seizure of Aircraft, reproduced in Dep't State Press Release No. 354 (Dec. 17, 1970).
14 Convention for Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation
Signed by United States Today in Montreal, Dep't State Press Release No. 213 (Sep.
23, 1971).
12 ICAO, Decisions of the Council LXXI/6, pt 1, reproduced in LXIII DEP'T STATE
BuLL. 453 (Oct. 19, 1970).
10 ICAO, LC/SC CR, Report (Apr. 27, 1971).
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II. THE ANTI-SKYJACKING PROGRAM-RISK AND RESPONSE
Regardless of what anti-skyjacking tools are available, the Govern-
ment bears the responsibility for obtaining maximum deterrence and
prevention at minimum cost. This responsibility requires a careful
analysis of the potential sources of skyjacking threats and application
of the relevant remedies. Such analysis may indicate that improved or
additional measures are required.
A. Outward-Directed Motives
Seizing control of an aircraft in flight, or placing it in jeopardy by
sabotage, gives enormous leverage to the skyjacker or saboteur. In the
classic blackmail pattern, this leverage can be utilized to secure goals
ranging from publicity for a cause, to release of prisoners, to payment
of ransom. In a more limited context the skyjacker may simply use his
control to divert the plane and escape from a jurisdiction which denies
him exit. Almost all the skyjackings we have experienced have involved
either blackmail or escape aspects, although it is not entirely clear that
blackmail or escape has been the skyjacker's primary motive. In any
event, these outward-directed motives are important and provide a foun-
dation for deterrent efforts addressed to decreasing the possible benefits
to skyjackers and increasing the risks they run.
1. Skyjacking for Blackmail
Not surprisingly, skyjacking for the common criminal purpose of ex-
torting ransom is a minimum threat. Because of the extensive system of
safety controls in aviation, the skyjacker is almost certain to be identified
and apprehended upon landing, and escape is essential to the extortionist.
In the only known case of cold-blooded extortion for financial gain a
group of bandits attempted to take control of a flight from Macao to
Hong Kong, met resistence from the crew, shot the pilot and co-pilot,
and caused the plane to crash at sea killing all but one bandit."
Where the blackmail objective is viewed as political, rather than per-
sonal, the virtual certainty of identification and apprehension is a less
effective deterrent because the skyjacker's ends may be achieved regard-
less of his individual fate. Furthermore, what he conceives as the
"political" character of his act at least in his own view may afford him
safe haven in a sympathetic jurisdiction. Therefore, skyjackings for
ostensibly "political" blackmail purposes have created some of our most
serious incidents and are a continuing threat to civil aviation.'
17 The incident occurred in July, 1948. N.Y. Times, July 28, 1948, § 1, at 18, col.
2; July 31, § 1, at 6, col. 3.
11 One of the better-known examples occurred on September 6, 1970, when Pales-
tinian guerrillas hijacked three aircraft: a Boeing 707 (TWA), a Douglas DC-8 (Swiss-
air), and a Boeing 747 (Pan Am). The TWA and Swissair aircraft were flown to
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To deter such skyjackers, the United States Government has sought to
mobilize world opinion behind the proposition that skyjacking is an
intolerable act, regardless of the nationality of the target aircraft and the
occupants and regardless of the motives of the skyjacker. The declara-
tions of the ICAO and United Nations General Assembly, the require-
ment in The Hague Convention that skyjackers be apprehended, extra-
dited, or criminally processed "without exception"'" and the worldwide
revulsion at the impositions on passengers in the September 1970 diver-
sions to Jordan have gone far to reduce the incentive to use skyjacking
as a means of dramatizing a cause. Government efforts to focus press
coverage on the skyjacker's victims and to deglamourise the skyjacker
contributed to this effect. Finally, where ransom has been sought as in
the Jordan case, the United States has used its diplomatic resources to
coordinate the efforts of victim states to ensure that minimum conces-
sions are made to the skyjackers and maximum pressure exerted against
any tendency to condone their acts. It is believed that worldwide ac-
ceptance of The Hague Convention would strengthen these tactics by
ensuring that skyjackers are treated as common criminals.
Government efforts on the side of direct prevention have been aimed
at the coordination of international intelligence efforts to follow suspects
since such hijackings are usually planned, conspiratorial acts. Behavioral
profiles and physical weapons detection devices are useful but may be
known to participants and avoidable. The sky marshal program seems
to have had a substantial deterrent effect, but the United States Govern-
ment recognizes the risks of a confrontation in the air and is looking
toward the eventual replacement of sky marshals by improved ground
security.
On the whole, the rash of blackmail incidents culminating in the
September 1970 Jordan affair seems to have faded in the face of inter-
national condemnation of such incidents. It is, however, essential not to
let up on the effort to force recognition that skyjackers, regardless of
claimed "political" motives, offend against the international air transport
system as well as against national safety and property interests. Wide-
spread adherence to The Hague Convention is essential to dispell the
expectation of asylum and to make clear that civil aviation is out of
bounds to those seeking to take political action against the flag state of
Dawson Field in Jordan and were destroyed there on September 12. The Pan Am
aircraft was flown to Cairo and destroyed there on the same date. Negotiations for the
release of the passengers and aircraft attracted widespread international publicity. See
statement of Talcott W. Seelye, Country Director, Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, Arab Repub-
lic, and Iraq, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State,
in Hearings on Resolutions Referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of
Representatives, Concerning Aircraft Hijacking and Related Matters, 91st Cong., 2d
Sess. 79 (1970).
19 Art. 7, Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, reproduced
in Dep't State Press Release No. 354 (Dec. 17, 1970).
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the aircraft. A sanctions convention highlighting the responsibility to
the international community of each state to join in the international
effort to protect civil aviation would mark a juridical breakthrough and
would contribute to the effective prevention of skyjacking by providing
a practical incentive and rationale for states to act against skyjackers
seeking their political sympathy.
2. Skyjacking for Refuge
Skyjacking to escape from a jurisdiction barring departure to the sky-
jacker for political reasons is not a threat to the United States which
permits free emigration,"0 but it is a continuing risk to the aviation sys-
tem. Moreover, skyjackers motivated by other concerns may be tempted
to assume the guise of refugee.2 Unlike the blackmailer, the refugee is
seeking control of the plane's destination rather than the passengers and
crew. Thus in choosing his escape route, he is critically interested in
weighing the risk of apprehension before landing against the risks en-
tailed in alternative escapes. He must also be concerned with finding
haven, safe from the risk of extradition.
Because of the virtual certainty of skyjacker apprehension, automatic
extradition to the skyjacker's homeland would provide almost absolute
deterrence for refugee skyjackers. Thus, in the initial stages of drafting
The Hague Convention, the United States argued for a mandatory extra-
dition provision." This proposal ran squarely up against the international
tradition of political asylum. It was argued that skyjacking from a
country not permitting free emigration is inherently a political act and
that political asylum in such a case can be warranted. A compromise
requiring prosecution for the skyjacking, and leaving extradition op-
tional, was accepted by the United States" in recognition of the asylum
tradition, and in the hope that severe penalties for skyjacking would
limit refugee skyjackings. The incidence of this type of skyjacking de-
pends on a number of factors but increasingly severe sentences in states
of landing, generated by system interests, are likely to cause such sky-
jackers to look carefully for alternative methods of escape.
20 Unlike the practice in a number of foreign countries, no exit visas are required
to leave the United States, nor are persons departing the United States normally
checked by the Immigration and Naturalization Service.
"1 Paper presented by H.L. Reighard, M.D., Deputy Federal Air Surgeon, to XVIII
International Congress of Aerospace Medicine, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, Sept. 15,
1969 in FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, TASK FORCE OF AIR PIRACY, HIJACK
REFERENCE DATA 1970).
"ICAO, LC/SC.SA WD 7 (May 2, 1969). See also Report of ICAO Legal Sub-
committee on Unlawful Seizure in AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, INTER-
NATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS (1969).
"Art. 7, Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, reproduced
in Dep't State Press Release No. 354 (Dec. 17, 1970).
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B. Individual, Inner-directed Motives
A substantial number of diversions of United States flag aircraft can-
not be fully explained in conventional terms. This is particularly true
of skyjackings to Cuba since these skyjackers (other than fleeing crim-
inals) are not barred from going to Cuba by the United States, and many
have had the financial means to arrange passage to Cuba via Mexico City.
A prominent psychiatrist, Dr. David Hubbard, who has analyzed
twelve such cases in depth,"4 believes that many are motivated by a
desire to escape personal problems. In some of these cases the desire to
assume control over the aircraft itself may be a significant motive and in
others the notion of a dramatic and "heroic" escape may be as important
as reaching the destination. Because these motives are individual, it is
difficult and perhaps impossible to achieve effective deterrence. At the
same time these hijackings are a significant threat and have already
caused one passenger's death and two injuries this year." A combination
of measures may, however, be somewhat effective.
The effort to create a negative, "criminal" image of skyjackers has
significant potential in undermining the heroic potential of the act. Un-
fortunately, the sympathy-potential of the political refugee skyjackers is
hard to control and creates a role capable of attracting frustrated indi-
viduals. Thus, a critical problem of deterrence is to separate alleged
from genuine refugees and to provide different standards of treatment
for each, of such a nature as to disuade the individualized-motive sky-
jacker from assuming a refugee role.
To this end, the United States pressed at The Hague for the principle
that extradition would be automatic unless a genuine political refugee
were involved. The United States' position was not adopted, but we
continue to believe it is necessary. In the present situation, the United
States continues to press, with some success," for the vigorous screening
of alleged refugees and the return of those without true refugee motives.
Because individual motives are hard to determine, efforts have been
undertaken to improve direct prevention of these skyjackings. The FAA
skyjacker profile is designed to detect the potential skyjacker in the
boarding process and, when supplemented with weapon detection de-
vices and searches, is very effective. Deputy United States marshals and
I See generally D. HUBBARD, THE SKYJACKER; His FLIGHTS OF FANCY (1971).
2 Unofficial statistics compiled by the Office of Aviation, Department of State,
Washington, D.C.
21On February 25, 1970, Chapin S. Paterson hijacked a Western Airlines flight to
Vancouver. Canadian authorities returned him to the United States on March 8, fol-
lowing a court hearing. Robert J. Labadie hijacked a TWA aircraft to Havana, Cuba,
on August 24, 1970. He was returned to the United States on a civilian refugee airlift
flight on September 24, 1970. James E. Bennett hijacked an Eastern Air Lines flight to
Nassau, Bahamas, on May 28, 1971. He was arrested upon arrival and returned to the
United States the next day, in the custody of U.S. Marshals.
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customs security officers are specially trained to cope with such indi-
viduals. On the whole, however, the risk from these skyjackers is hard to
counter, and one can only hope that effective action against outward-
directed skyjackers and minimization of publicity will turn power drives
and escape fantasies into less dangerous channels.
III. THE FUTURE AND THE SPIN-OFFS
While the United States believes that its coordinated program will
limit skyjacking, there remains a constant threat which requires con-
tinuous countereffort. As Dr. David Hubbard has said:
Actually, any simplistic explanation is doomed. There are many factors
operating, and each is important at various levels of the event. Any indi-
vidual addicted to 'one cause and effect thinking' can hit a snag ....
Times change, people change, circumstances change, physiology alters,
politics rumble, war threatens, etc., and out of the aggregate of these
forces emerge skyjackers with a variable rate of incidence."
It is not easy to find a bright spot in this seemingly eternal tolerance
of cost and risk. But the international efforts to control skyjacking may
provide models for future limitation of risks to economic interdependence,
and at least indicate the kinds of problems which must be faced. In this
process, the first step is recognition by individual states that certain
behavior poses a risk to them which they cannot control without inter-
national assistance. A primary response is international recognition of
the concerned states' jurisdictional rights, a step taken in the 1963 Tokyo
Convention."
The international implications of the problem become more apparent
as states recognize that each manifestation threatens not only a national
interest but also a joint interest in the activity endangered. This stage has
been reached with respect to assaults on diplomats, the impact of pol-
lution on sea resources and the improper uses of outer space. States must
also come to the recognition that common standards of acceptable and
unacceptable action and a commitment to enforce those standards are
required to protect the common interest, a step taken in The Hague
Convention of 1970 and in the Montreal Convention of 1971." Finally,
states must come to grip with the fact that international standards must
be applied if anti-skyjacking efforts are to be effective. So long as the
power of application rests with national sovereignty, the international
community must exert effective pressure against member states to ensure
2TD. HUBBARD, THE SKYJACKER; His FLIGHTS OF FANCY 221 (1970).
28 Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft,
Sep. 14, 1963 [1969] 3 U.S.T. 1859, T.I.A.S. No. 6768 (effective Dec. 4, 1969).
29 Convention for Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation
Signed by United States Today in Montreal, Dep't State Press Release No. 213 (Sep. 23,
1971).
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action. A needed step is to provide a mechanism for reviewing state
action or inaction under international standards; the second, and per-
haps harder step, is to provide mechanisms for international community
action. It may be that the independent determination of compliance
called for in the United States-Canada sanctions proposal would suffice
through public pressure to ensure compliance. I believe that where state
action is in pursuance of international interests, the international com-
munity must ultimately have positive means for influencing that action.
In summation, the lessons we have learned in the continuing fight
against skyjacking are valuable. It is regrettable that we have had to
endure them, but our ability to apply what we have experienced in other
areas may provide some lightening of the burden.

